

# The Yogācāra-mādhyamika Refutation of the Position of the Satyākāra and Alīkākāra-vādins of the Yogācāra School. Part III.

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## CONTENTS

- I. The Characteristic of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika Philosophy.
- II. The *Vijñāna* Theory of Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra.
- III. The Yogācāra-mādhyamika Refutation of the Position of the Satyākāra and Alīkākāra-vādins.
- III. 1. The focus of the refutation of the views of the Satyākāra and Alīkākāra-vādins.
- III. 2. Kamalaśīla's refutation of the Satyākāra and Alīkākāra-vādin positions in his *Bhāvanākrama*.
- III. 3. Kamalaśīla's refutation of the Alīkākāra-vādin position in his *Madhyamakāloka*.
- IV. Explanation of the Term, "Yogācāra-mādhyamika" and its Philosophical Characteristics in the *lTa ba'i khyad par* of Ye šes sde.
- V. Conclusion.

## ABBREVIATIONS

- AAPV : *Abhisamayālaṃkāraḥ Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* of Haribhadra.  
Ad. : *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*, SOR XLVI, ed. by E. Conze.  
Bhk I : *Bhāvanākrama* of Kamalaśīla, Minor Buddhist Texts, part I & II, ed. by G. Tucci, 1978, Rinsen Book Company, Kyoto.  
Bhk II : The Tibetan Text of the Second *Bhāvanākrama*, ed. by Kiyotaka Goshima.  
Bhk III : Third *Bhāvanākrama*, Minor Buddhist Texts, part III, SOR XLIII, Roma, 1971.  
BST : Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Darbhanga.  
D : The sDe dge edition, preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo.  
LAS : *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra*, ed. by Bunyu Nanjo.  
MAK : *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-kārikā* of Śāntaraksita (P. No. 5258. Vol. 101. Sa48b<sup>7</sup>—52b<sup>1</sup> D. No. 3884. Sa53a<sup>1</sup>—56b<sup>3</sup>).

- Māl : *Madhyamakāloka* of Kamalaśīla (P.No. 5287. Vol. 101. Sa143b<sup>2</sup>—275a<sup>4</sup>; D.No. 3887. Sa133b<sup>4</sup>—244a<sup>7</sup>).
- MAP : *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla (P.No. 5287. Vol. 101. Sa84b<sup>7</sup>—143b<sup>2</sup>; D.No. 3887. Sa84a<sup>1</sup>—133b<sup>4</sup>).
- MAV : *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti* of Śāntaraksita (P.No. 5285. Vol. 101. Sa52b<sup>1</sup>—84b<sup>7</sup>; D.No. 3885. Sa56b<sup>4</sup>—84a<sup>1</sup>).
- MHVT : *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-vṛtti-tarkajvālā* (D.No. 3856 [Dsa 40b<sup>7</sup>—329b<sup>4</sup>]).
- om : The edition omits the letter or the word.
- P : The Peking edition; The Tibetan Tripiṭaka ed. by Daisetz Suzuki, Tokyo-Kyoto 1954-1963.
- Part I : Seitetsu Moriyama, The Yogācāra-mādhyamika Refutation of the Position of the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādins of the Yogācāra School. Part I: A Translation of Portion of Haribhadra's Abhisamayālaṃkāra-lokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā. *Memoirs of the Postgraduate Research Institute Bukkyo University*, No.12. (1984).
- Part II : Idem, Part II. Tsuboi Shunei hakase Koki-kinen-ronshū *Bukkyō bunka ronkō* (1984).
- Part III : Idem, Part III, *Journal of Humanistic Studies* (Jimbungaku-Ronshū) Vol. XVIII (1984). Bukkyo University Kyoto, JAPAN.
- SDNS : *Sarvadharmanihśvasiddhi* of Kamalaśīla (P.No. 5289. Vol. 101. Sa312a<sup>4</sup>—338a<sup>5</sup>; D.No. 3889. Sa273a<sup>4</sup>—291a<sup>7</sup> N.No. 3280. Sa301a<sup>6</sup>—323a<sup>4</sup> C. Tanjur, Vol.28 (Sa)ff 269a<sup>5</sup>—288a<sup>7</sup>).
- SDNS IV : A Translation of Kamalaśīla's *Sarvadharmanihśvabhāva-siddhi* Part IV, *The Bukkyō Daigaku Kenkyū-kiyō* (Journal of Bukkyo University), Vol. 69, (1960).
- SDV : *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-vṛtti* of Jñānagarbha, (D.No. 3882).
- SOR : Serie Orientale Roma.
- Tkh : *lTa ba'i khyad par* of Ye šes sde, ed. by Daishun Ueyama, *Bukkyōgaku-kenkyū* (The Studies in Buddhism), No., 32.33, March, 1977, Ryukoku University, Kyoto, Japan.
- V : AAPV, ed. by P.L. Vaidya, BST. No. IV.
- W : AAPV, ed. by U. Wogihara.

### I. The Characteristics of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika Philosophy

As I have pointed out earlier,<sup>(1)</sup> the following description in the *Madhyamakāloka-nāma* (Māl) of Kamalaśīla (c. A.D.740—795) succinctly represents the philosophical position of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika.

(1) See II The Yogācāra-mādhyamika view of Mind-only (*citta-mātra*) of Part II.

<sup>(2...</sup> “The theory of mind-only (*citta-mātra*) is reasonable from the standpoint of conventional truth (*samvṛtyā*) since it is inherently established. On the other hand, the object of external world is not reasonable even from the standpoint of conventional truth since the external world independent of the mind [or internal world] cannot be established.”<sup>...2)</sup>

Let us examine the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti* of Śāntarakṣita (c. A.D. 725–788) while referring to Kamalaśīla’s commentary the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-ṣaṅgikā* to ascertain whether the above description represents the position of the Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika.

<sup>(3...</sup> That which is subject to the condition of cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*) is none other than mind-only. That which is inherently established is the product of the mind.<sup>...3)</sup>

(MAK. 91)

<sup>(4...</sup> [We] cannot recognize the other nature of cognition (*jñāna*) apart from that which possesses the nature that can inherently be established (viz., unperceivable object). That which is characterized by being inherently established [as well as mind] possesses the nature like dream (*svapna*) or illusion (*māyā*), etc. Even though [objects] such as color-form (*rūpa*) which are assumed to exist in the external world exist independently of cog-

(2) Māi P171a<sup>5-6</sup> D157a<sup>6-7</sup>

sems tsam ni rañ gis rab tu grub pa'i no bo ñid yin pa'i phyir kun rdzob tu gnas pa kho na yin la / phyi'i don ni kun rdzob tu yañ mi gnas te / sems kyi rnam pa las ma gtogs par de grub pa med pa'i phyir ro // cf. Note (6) of Part II.

(3) MAV P78b<sup>4</sup> D78b<sup>7</sup>

rgyu dan 'bras bur gyur pa yañ // śes pa 'ba' žig kho na ste // rañ gis grub pa gañ yin pa // de ni śes par gnas pa yin // (MAK 91)

(4) MAP P78b<sup>4</sup>-79a<sup>4</sup> D79a<sup>1-6</sup>

rañ gis grub pa'i no bo bor nas śes pa'i no bo gžan rtogs pa med do // rañ gis grub pa'i rañ bžin yañ rmi lam dan sgyu ma la sogs pa'i gzugs bžin no // gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol tu 'dod pa rnams śes pa las gud na yod par gžug<sup>2</sup> na yañ mig la sogs pa bžin du<sup>3</sup> dus mñam pa dan mi mñam pa'i tshe<sup>4</sup> rab tu ñe ba'i rgyu med pas rig par mi 'grub bo //de lta bas na de dag myoñ ba ni tha dad pa ma yin pa'i sñon po la<sup>5</sup> sogs pa'i rnam pa myoñ ba ste /myoñ ba'i no bo yin pas rmi lam dan sgyu ma la sogs pa'i<sup>6</sup> myoñ ba bžin no //gal te śes pa'i rnam pa bskeñ pa'i don gžan žig 'bras bu las gud na yod par rjes su dpog na / de lta na yañ mñon sum du grub par ma gyur gyi rjes su dpag par zad do //de lta na yañ 'di med par grub ste /de ma thag pa'i rkyen ñes par yod pa dan / rdul phra mo la sogs pa bkag pa'i phyir ro //de ltar byas na stug po bkod pa dan /dgoñs pa ñes par 'grel pa la sogs pa las 'byuñ ba thams cad dan 'thun<sup>7</sup> pa yin no // lañ kar gśegs pa las / phyi rol gzugs ni yod ma yin // rañ gi sems ni phyi rol snañ // <sup>...8</sup>žes bstan pa 'di yañ legs par bśad pa yin no sñam du sems so // blo'i<sup>10</sup> mthu mi chuñ ba dan lhag par mōn du brtson pa dag gis kyañ sems de la gcig dan du ma'i rañ bžin du brtags na / don dam par sñiñ po mi mthoñ bas / yañ dag par 'dod pa ma yin no // de'i phyir /

1. D has *no bor na*    2. D has *bžugs*    3. P om.    4. D has *tshe na*    5. D has *sñon po la*    6. D has *gzugs*  
 7. D has *mthun*    8. LAS. ch.X-489 ab: *bahirdhā nāsti vai rūpaṃ dṛśyate bahiḥ* /  
 9. P has /    10. P has *blo yi*

nition, they cannot be perceived since there is no cause (*hetu*) of eyesight [, light and attention, etc.] which are placed close by and simultaneously in one moment and also in subsequent moments. That is why perceiving [such objects as color-form] is to perceive images, such as the color-blue, inseparable from [cognition]. [Such object as color-form which is assumed to exist in the external world] is like a perception of dream or illusion in that it is product of perception. Even though you infer that object which produces the images of cognition is independent of effect [, cognition], that inference is still nothing more than an inference which cannot be ascertained by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). If so, [such object as color-form] would be proven to be a non-existence. The reason is that the immediately-preceding moment of mind (*samanantara-pratyaya*) is a certainty, yet such object as atom (*anu*) is negated.

[Objection of Vijñānavādin:] Accordingly, description in the *Gaṇanavyūha* and the *Samdhinirmocana* [viz., the theory that all existences are products of mind-only (*citta-mātra*)] is reasonable in every cases. The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*

color-form (*rūpa*) does not exist in the external world, but it is our own mind that manifests in the external world.

This teaching has by no means any kind of error.

[Answer:] When (*Buddhān bhagavantah*) who possesses supreme wisdom, (ordinary people (*prthag-jana*) and bodhisattvas) who make exertions examine the mind in terms of intrinsic nature of unity or manifoldness (*ekāneka-svabhāva*), they by no means find any [eternal] essence. That is why we do not regard mind as absolute existence. (The theory of mind-only is reasonable to lead to higher truth.) Therefore,

Depending on mind-only, one must comprehend that [object] in the external world is non-existent. Abiding in the tenet [that all existences are devoid of intrinsic nature], one should comprehend that even mind is also devoid of eternal self.<sup>(5)</sup> (MAK 92)

Moreover, after having cited the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*,<sup>(6)</sup> Śāntarakṣita comments on the verse

(5) *sems tsam la ni brten nas su // phyi rol dños med ses par bya // tshul 'dir brten nas de la yañ // śin tu bdag med śes par bya* // (MAK 92)

(6) MAV P79b<sup>1-4</sup> D79b<sup>3-4</sup> (=LAS, X-256, 257, 258. Bhk I. p.210<sup>9-14</sup>. Mā P171a<sup>2-4</sup> D157a<sup>5-6</sup> cf. Part I. Note (56a))

*sems tsam la ni brten nas su // phyi rol don la mi rtog go // <sup>1</sup> yañ dag dmigs par gnas nas su // sems tsam las kyañ śin tu bzla // 1. P has /*

*sems tsam las ni bzlas nas kyañ // snañ ba med las śin tu bzla // snañ med gnas pa'i rnal 'byor pa // de yis theg pa chen por mthoñ //*

*'jug pa lhun gyis grub cin ži // smon lam dag gis rnam par sbyaṅs // ye śes dam pa bdag med pa // snañ ba med la mi mthoñ ño // <sup>1</sup> 1. Pom.*

MAV P79b<sup>3-4</sup> D79b<sup>4-5</sup> (=LAS, X-592, 595)

shown above, in which he quotes verses twenty-one and thirty-four of the *Yuktiśaṣṭikā*<sup>(7)</sup> for the purpose of demonstrating his way of understanding the theory of mind-only (*citta-mātra*). His comment begins with “It is also said in the following portions.”<sup>(8)</sup> Kamalaśīla then comments on the words of Śāntarakṣita as follows: The theory of mind-only is stated from the standpoint of conventional truth.<sup>(9)</sup>

Hence the theory of mind-only is acknowledged to be effective and reasonable from only the standpoint of conventional truth for Kamalaśīla as well as Śāntarakṣita.<sup>1</sup> In other words Kamalaśīla as well as Śāntarakṣita regards it as acceptable for the purpose of leading to highest truth of the Mādhyamika.<sup>(10)</sup> Mind (*citta*) is also devoid of intrinsic nature from the viewpoint of highest truth. In this respect their philosophical position differs from that of Viññānavādin. The reason for this is that the theory of mind-only is conventional truth for Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, while it is absolute truth for the Viññānavādin. In addition, Kamalaśīla’s philosophical position on this point can also be ascertained in his *Bhāvanākrama*.

<sup>(11)</sup> “Ordinary people [mistakenly imagine] that such objects as color-form (*rūpa*) exist independent [of the mind in the external world] because they have been attached since the beginningless past to such objects as color-form which is unreal and false. However, in

(7) MAV P79b<sup>5-7</sup> D79b<sup>6</sup> (=Yuktiśaṣṭikā K° 21,34) Ichigo Masamichi, 一郷正道. Yugagyō-chūganha 瑜伽行中觀派 koza Daijyō Bukkyō 講座大乘仏教 No.7. (1982) Chūgan shisō 中觀思想 p205.

(8) MAV P79b<sup>5</sup> D79b<sup>5-6</sup>

*’dir yañ gsuñs pa /*

(9) MAP P138b<sup>1-2</sup> D129b<sup>2</sup>

*’dir yañ gsuñs pa zes<sup>1</sup> bya ba ni sems tsam kun r’bzob tu smra ba’o // 1. P has šes*

SDNS P332b<sup>1-2</sup> D287<sup>7</sup>-288a<sup>1</sup> (Tr. Note(30),(69))

*skye ba dan ’gag pa la sogs pa la mñon par zen pa’i gdul bya<sup>1</sup> la chad<sup>2</sup> par lla ba yonś su spañ ba’i phyir bcom ldan ’das kyis ’phags pa dgoñs pa nes par ’grel ba la sogs pa las rnams par šes pa la sogs pa yod pa ñid du bstan<sup>3</sup> pa gañ yin pa de yañ don dam par ma yin no zes bya bar gzuñ bar bya ste /*

1. P has ba 2. D has khyad 3. D has brtan

cf. Māl P166b<sup>4-6</sup> D153b<sup>1-3</sup>, P164a<sup>5-6</sup> D151<sup>6-9</sup> (SDNS IV Note(121)) and MAP P132a<sup>5-6</sup> D124<sup>6-7</sup> (SDNS IV Note (136))

(10) cf. Part I. p28.

(11) BhkIII p6<sup>15-7-9</sup>

*cittam evānādīkālīkavitatharūpādyabhiniveśavaśt svapnopalabhyamānarūpādipratibhāsavad bālānām bahir vicchinnaṃ iva rūpādipratibhāsaṃ khyāti / tasmāc cittamātram eva traidhātukam / sa evaṃ cittam eva sakala-prajñāptiṃ niścītya (tatra pratyavekṣya) ca sarvadharmāṇām svabhāvaḥ pratyavekṣīto bhavātīti cittasvabhāvam apī pratyavekṣate/ sa evaṃ vicārayati / cittam apī paramārthato māyāvad anutpannam / yadā hy alīkasvabhāvarūpādyākāropagraheṇa cittam eva citrākāraṃ pratibhāsate tadāsyāpi rūpādivat tadavyatirekāt satyatvaṃ kutra (bhavet ? yathā ci) trākāratayā rūpādayo(naikānekasvabhāvāḥ)tathā cittam apī tadavyatirekeṇa naikānekasvabhāvam / nāpi cittam utpādyamānaṃ kutaścīd āgacchati / nāpi nirudhyamānaṃ kvacīd gacchati / nāpi svaparobhayataḥ paramārthenāsyotpādo yuktah / tasmān māyopamam eva cittam / yathā cittam evaṃ sarvadharmā māyāvat paramārthato’nutpannāḥ /*

cf. Bhk II. p37<sup>24</sup>-43<sup>8</sup>

fact, the mind (*citta*) manifests by possessing color-form, just like in dreaming.

That is why all existences in the three realms (*traiḍhātuka*) are product of the mind-only (*citta-mātra*). Thus after ascertaining and examining that the very mind produces all kinds of designation (*prajñapti*), he [viz., yogin] scrutinizes the nature of mind. This is because [the examination of the nature of mind] is tantamount to having examined all existences. He examines as follows: mind is also non-arising (*anutpanna*) just as illusion (*māyā*) from the viewpoint of highest truth. The reason for this is that whenever the mind manifests with manifold images (*citrākāra*) by having perceived images such as color-form which are characterized by their unreality, then how is the mind real since it is also not detached [from manifold images] like color-form, etc.? Just as color-form, etc., are devoid of intrinsic nature of either unity or multiplicity (*naikāneka-svabhāva*) seeing that they possess manifold images, so mind is also devoid of intrinsic nature of either unity or multiplicity since it is not detached from manifold images.

The mind which is arising comes from nowhere, and the mind which is perishing also goes nowhere. It is not reasonable that [the mind] is produced from itself, from others, or from both [itself and others] from the point of view of highest truth. Accordingly, the mind is just like illusion. Just as the mind, all existences—like illusion—are also nonarising from the viewpoint of highest truth.<sup>11)</sup>

Thus Kamalaśīla compares the mind to illusion. Yet what kind of existence is illusion? He advocates as follows:

<sup>(12...)</sup>“What possesses no cause (*kāraṇa*) even from the standpoint of conventional truth (*saṃvṛtyā*) is not produced even from the standpoint of conventional truth just as horns of a rabbit. On the other hand, what possesses [cause from the standpoint of conventional truth] — although it is unreal (*alīka*) from the viewpoint of highest truth — can still be produced [from the standpoint of conventional truth,] just as illusion (*māyā*) or reflection (*pratibimba*). Although illusion, etc., are of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*)

(12) Bhk I. p528<sup>22</sup>-529<sup>2</sup>

*kimtu yasya saṃvṛtyāpi kāraṇaṃ nāsti sa saṃvṛtyāpi notpadyate / yathā śaśaviśāṇādi / yasya tu vidyate sa paramārthato 'liko 'pi samutpadyate eva / yathā māyāpratibimbādi / na ca māyadeḥ saṃvṛtyā pratītyasamutpāde paramārthato vastutvaḥprasaṅgaḥ / tasya vicārākṣamatvāt / ataḥ sarvaṃ eva māyopamaṃ jagat /*  
Māl P184a7-b<sup>1</sup> D169a3-5

'on kyaṅ gaṅ gaṅ la dus thams cad du kun rbozob tu<sup>1</sup> yaṅ rgyu med pa de ni tha sñad du yaṅ mi skye ba ñid de / dper na ri boṅ gi rva la sogs pa lta bu'o //gaṅ la yod pa de ni don dam pa ño bo ñid med kyaṅ skye ste /<sup>2</sup> dper na sgyu ma dan gzugs brñan la sogs pa lta bu'o // sgyu ma la sogs pa 'di rten ciñ 'brel bar 'byuñ ba yin yaṅ dños po ñid du thal ba ma yin te / grags pa dan tshad mas gnod pa'i phyir ro// 1. P has du 2. D om.

from the standpoint of conventional truth, they still do not constitute existence (*vastutva*) from the point of view of highest truth. The reason is that they do not hold up to analytic examination (*vicārākṣamatvāt*). Therefore, all existences are like illusion.<sup>...12)</sup>

Taking all these together, we can safely conclude that the mind (*citta*) like illusion is not an absolute existence but merely a conventional existence. Moreover, such external object as atom has already been rejected even by the mind which is of conventional existence. Therefore the external object independent of the mind [or internal world] cannot be acknowledged even from the standpoint of conventional truth. This is because objects in the external world — which the ordinary people regard to be independent of the mind — are none other than manifestation of the mind (*citta*) which is a conventional existence. These facts clearly show the position of the Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika school.

In contrast to this Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika position, Bhāvaviveka (c. A.D.500–570) as representative of the Sautrāntika-mādhyaṃikas, advocates that the real meaning of mind-only indicates not the rejection of the external world itself, but the rejection of the idea that an independent entity as a thought-construction (*vikalpa*) exists from the mind.<sup>(13)</sup> Candrakīrti (c. A.D. 600–650) of the Prāsaṅgikas also holds the same view as Bhāvaviveka.<sup>(14)</sup> Furthermore, Bhāvaviveka regards, in terms of conventional truth, the existence of aggregation (*saṃcita*) of the same kind of atoms — such as a pot — as cause of cognition.<sup>(15)</sup>

In addition — as I have previously discussed and concluded — Jñānagarbha (c. A.D. 700–760), Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Haribhadra (c. A.D.800) took the same position in refuting 1) the atomic theory which the Vaiśeṣika, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika saw as representing the existence of the external world independent of the mind and 2) the theory of the Satyākāra-vādins and Alikākāra-vādins of the Yogācāra school. On the basis of this commonality, they represent one lineage of the Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika school.<sup>(16)</sup>

(13) (14) cf. II. *The Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika view of Mind-only(citta-mātra)* of Part II.

(15) See Kajiyama Yūichi 梶山雄一, Chūgan shisō no Rekishi to Bunken 中觀思想の歴史と文献 (History and Bibliography of Philosophy of Mādhyaṃika), Kōza Daijō Bukkyō, No.7 (Nov. 1982), Chūgan Shisō 講座・大乘仏教7, 中觀思想. pp.40–41.

(16) See III, IV, V and Conclusion of Part II.

This method of refuting the theory of atoms and the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādin positions respectively can also be found in the *Tattvavatāra-kārikā* (TAK) of Śrīgupta.

Kārikā 2 and 3 refute the theory of atoms, kārikā 4 refutes the theory of the Satyākāra-vādin and kārikā 5 refutes the theory of the Alikākāra-vādin. Moreover, kārikā 14 and 15 explain that the doctrine of things possessing some intrinsic nature is taught as skillful means (*upāya*) to lead disciples (*vineya*) to highest truth of *śūnyatā*. In addition Śrīgupta is said to be a teacher of Jñānagarbha. That is why we should hereafter examine the philosophical relationship Śrīgupta and not only Jñānagarbha but also Śāntarakṣita Kamalaśīla,

Let us now summarize these points below.

According to Kamalaśīla, all existences (*sarvadharmā*) are included in the category of material things (*rūpin*) and immaterial things (*arūpin*). “*Rūpin*” stands for aggregate (*skandha*), the sphere of the senses (*āyatana*) and primary elements (*dhātu*), while “*arūpin*” stands for the mind (*citta*)<sup>(17)</sup>. On the other hand, Haribhadra sums up all existences as those that are capable of effect (*arthakriyā-karin*), such category as the knowable (*jñeya-rūpa*) and the knowledge (*jñāna-rūpa*)<sup>(18)</sup>. In beginning with their examination of material things, they refute the theory of atoms (*anu*) as stated by the proponents of the existence of external world. They, then, define manifestation of such objects as color-form (*rūpa*) to be product of the mind-only (*citta-mātra*)<sup>(20)</sup>.

<sup>(21)...</sup>Therefore, [the Yogin] would also examine material things (*rūpin*) in order to obtain the understanding that all existence is devoid of eternal self (*dharmanairātmya*). How could these [material things] be a reality independent of the mind (*citta*) seen from the viewpoint of highest truth (*paramārthasat*)? That is why the very mind which possesses the appearance of color-form, etc., manifests just as [objects] appear while dreaming. (The Yogin), in exploring (material things) from the point of view of atom (*paramāṇuśaḥ*), does not regard atoms [as reality] when he analyzes atoms into actions (*bhāga*). (The Yogin), who does not regard [atoms as reality], is released from thought-construction (*vikalpa*) as to whether [material things] are real or not. He, then, comprehends that [all exist-

and Haribhadra. cf. Note (23) (30)

cf. Ejima Yasunori 江島惠教 chūgan-shisō no tenkai 中觀思想の展開 pp218-220. Japanese Tr. of TAK.

(17) Bhk. I. p202<sup>12-13</sup>

*dividhā bhāvā rūpiṇo 'rūpiṇaś ca /*

Bhk. III. p5<sup>12-14</sup>

*rūpyarūpibhedena ca saṃkṣepāt sarvadharmasamgrahaḥ / tatra rūpaskandhasamgrhitā rūpiṇaḥ / vedanādiskandhasvabhāvā arūpiṇaḥ /*

Bhk. II. pp37<sup>24</sup>-39<sup>3</sup>

*chos la bdag med pa yan 'di ltar bsgom par bya ste / chos zes bya ba ni mdor bsdus na phuṅs po lña dan / skye mched bcu gñis dan / khams bco brgyad do // de la phuṅ po dan / skye mched dan / khams dan gzugs can gañ dag yin pa de dag ni don dam par na sems kyi rnam pa las gud na med do //*

(18) AAPV W.p624<sup>7-12</sup> V.458<sup>2-5</sup>

*nāsiddho'yaṃ hetuḥ yasmāt prekṣāvataṃ pravṛteḥ prayojanavattayā vyāptatvāt arthakriyāyogapadārthaviśayo vicāryaḥ anyathā arthakriyarthināṃ pumsām asadarthapadārthavicāraiḥ kiṃ prayojanam ity arthakriyākāri bhāvo'bhyupagantavyaḥ / sa cānyonyavyavacchedarūpatvāj jñeyarūpo vā bhayej jñānarūpo veti vikalpaḥ /*

See Tr. of AAPV of Part I, pp.37-38.

(19) See Tr. of AAPV of Part I, p.38-46 and footnote concerning MAV and MAP.

(20) See Tr. of AAPV of Part I, pp.46-48 and footnote concerning MAV.

(21) Bhk. III. p.65<sup>-11</sup>

*tato rūpiṇo'pi dharmān dharmanairātmyādhigamāya vicārayet / kim ete cittavyatirekena paramārthasantaḥ sthitaḥ / ahośvic cittam eva rūpadinirbhāsaṃ svapnāvasthāyāṃ pratibhāsavat pratibhāsata iti / sa tān paramā-*



ence] which belongs to the three world (*traiḍhātuka*) is a product of mind-only (*citta-mātra*). There is nothing else.”<sup>(21)</sup>

After this Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra go on to examine mind as an immaterial things. As a result they lead to the conclusion that mind is also devoid of intrinsic nature like illusion (*māyā*) from the point of view of highest of the Mādhyaṃika.<sup>(22)</sup>

Furthermore, according to Kamalaśīla, these examinations are conducted by the Yogins who — out of their great compassion (*mahā-karuṇā*) toward ordinary people — aim to remove ordinary people's inverted and erroneous conceptions which regard external world or the mind to be of real existence, and to lead them to highest truth that all existence is devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*).<sup>(23)</sup>

This position can also be traced back to Jñānagarbha.

“After [the Blessed One (Bhagavat)] with compassion (*karuṇā*) observed a person who was bound by thought-construction, he proclaimed the teachings of bondage and liberation (*mokṣa*) according to the doctrine of mind-only (*citta-mātra*), etc. (SDK. 32)

The Blessed One, who thoroughly examined [the law] of deed (*karma*) and its effect and was the incarnation of compassion, observed sentient being bound by iron fetters, that is, thought-construction in the prison of transmigration (*saṃsāra*). Then, with the mind that observes things as they really are, he removed all attachments with regard to

*nuṣo nirūpayan paramāṇāṃś ca bhūgaṣaḥ pratyavekṣamāno nopalabhate / tathā cānupalabhamānas teṣu asti-  
nāstituvavikalpān nivartayati / cittamātram ca traidhātukam avatarati nānyathā /*

(22) Bhk. III. pp.6<sup>15</sup>-7<sup>9</sup>

*cittam evānādikālikāvitatharūpādyabhiniveśaśāt svāpnopalabhyamānarūpādipratibhāśavad bālānām bahir vic-  
hinnam iva rūpādipratibhāśam khyāti / tasmāc cittamātram eva traidhātukam / sa evaṃ cittam eva sakalapra-  
jñaptim niścīya tatra pratyavekṣya ca sarvadharmāṇām svabhāvaḥ pratyavekṣito bhavātīti cittasvabhāvam api  
pratyavekṣate / sa evaṃ vicārayati / cittam api paramārthato māyāvad anuṭpannam / yadā hy alikasvabhāva-  
rūpādyākāropagraheṇa cittam eva citrākāraṃ pratibhāśate tadāsyāpi rūpādivat tadavyatirekāt satyatvaṃ kutra  
bhavet yathā citrākāratayā rūpādayo naikānekasvāvaḥ tathā cittam api tadavyatirekeṇa naikānekasvabhāvam /  
nāpi cittam utpādyamānaṃ kutaścid āgacchati / nāpi nirudhyamānaṃ kvacid gacchati / svaparobhayaṭaḥ pa-  
ramārthenāśyotpādo yuktaḥ / tasmān māyoḥamam eva cittam / yathā cittam evaṃ sarvadharmā māyāvat  
paramārthato' nūṭpannāḥ /*

cf. Bhk.II. pp.39<sup>6</sup>-43<sup>1</sup>

(23) Bhk.III. p.5<sup>14</sup>-17

*tatra bālā bhāvādigrahābhiniveśād viparyastadhīvaḥ saṃsāre paribhramanti / teṣāṃ viparyāsāpanayanāya teṣu  
ca mahākaruṇāṃ āmukhikṛtya niṣpannaśamatho yogi tattvādhigamāya toto vipaśyanāṃ bhāvayet /*

(24) SDV D13a<sup>2-4</sup>

*thugs rje'i bdag ŋid de ŋid kyis // de ŋid rtogs paś bciṃś pa zgziś nas ni // sems tsam la sogs bye brag giś / bciṃś  
pa thar pa bstan pa mdzad // bcom ldan 'das las dañ 'bras bu mkhyen pa thugs rje'i rañ bžin gyi sku can de  
ŋid kyis 'khor ba'i btson rar 'gro ba rtog pa'i lcags sgrog giś bciṃś pa la zgziś nas / bsaṃ pa ji lta ba bžin du  
phuñ po dañ khamś dañ skye mched dañ / sems tsam dañ / chos thams cad bdag med par bstan pa'i rim gyis  
dños por 'dzin pa ma lus par sel bar mdzad ciñ / 'gro ba la bciṃś pa dañ thar pa bstan pa mdzad do //*

existence (bhāva) based on doctrines examined in the following order with respect to the aggregates (*skandha*), spheres of the senses (*āyatana*), primary elements (*dhātu*) up to [the doctrines of] mind-only (*citta-mātra*) and all existence as being devoid of eternal self (*anātman*). He, then, taught sentient beings living in transmigration the doctrines of bondage and liberation.<sup>...24)</sup>

Thus, Kamalaśīla is indebted to Jñānagarbha as well as to Śāntarakṣita.<sup>(24 1)</sup>

## II. The *Viññāna* Theory of Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra

Let us examine Kamalaśīla's *viññāna* theory according to his *Sarvadharmāṇiḥsvabhāva-siddhi*.

<sup>(25...</sup> “Ordinary people still hypostatize (*samāropa*) from the viewpoint of highest truth the arising of such things as illusion (*māyā*) which are acceptable only so long as they are not examined carefully (*avicāraikāramya*), and which are produced by dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpanna*).”<sup>...25)</sup>

Moreover,

<sup>(26...</sup> “Those things — which are acceptable only so long as they are not examined carefully, that is, produced by dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpanna*) — have a dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*).”<sup>...26)</sup>

Taking all these together, illusion (*māyā*) is tantamount to that which is acceptable only so

(24-1)

In addition Jñānagarbha and Kamalaśīla share a common characteristic in citing the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* and *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* when they examine existence in the sense of conventional truth and highest truth.

SDV D9a<sup>3-5</sup>

*mdo las ji skad du / dños rnams skye ba kun rdzob tu // dam pa'i don du rañ bžin med // rañ bžin med la 'khrul pa gañ // de ni yañ dag kun rdzob 'dod // .....*

*mdo las ji skad du / rab 'byor phyin ci log ma gtogs par gañ la gnas nas byis pa so so'i skye bo rnams las mñon par 'du byed par 'gyur ba'i dños po bden pa ni skra'i rtse mo'i cha šas gzugs pa'i tshad tsam yañ med do žes gsuñs pa lta bu'o //*

=Mäl P168a<sup>3-5</sup> D154b<sup>4-5</sup>, SDNS P331b<sup>8</sup> D287b<sup>1-2</sup> (cf. SDNS IV Note (115))

=LAS X-429, Ad. p.123<sup>3-5</sup>

(25) SDNS P331b<sup>3-4</sup> D287a<sup>6</sup>

*sgyu ma bžin du ma brtags na dga' ba rten cin 'brel bar 'byuñ ba'i dños po thams cad la byis pa rnams kyis don dam par skye ba la sogs par sgro 'dogs pa*

cf. SDNS. IV Note (113)

(26) SDNS P332a<sup>4-5</sup> D287b<sup>4</sup>

*'di ltar ma brtags par grags pa dños po rnams kyi rten cin 'brel bar 'byuñ ba'i ño bo ñid gañ yin pa de ni gžan gyi dbaṅ gi ño bo ñid de /*

cf. SDNS. IV Note (118)

long as it is not examined carefully, that which is produced by dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāna*), and that which has a dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*)<sup>(27)</sup>.

In addition, Kamalaśīla regards illusion (*māyā*) as both mind (*citta*) or existence as seen from the conventional truth in this way:

<sup>(28...</sup> “Mind (*citta*) is also non-arising (*anutpāna*) just as illusion (*māyā*) from the viewpoint of highest truth is non-arising.”<sup>...28)</sup>

<sup>(29...</sup> “What possesses [cause (*kāraṇa*) from the standpoint of conventional truth] — although it is unreal (*alika*) from the viewpoint of highest truth — can still be produced [from the standpoint of conventional truth,] just as illusion (*māyā*) or reflection (*pratibimba*). Although such things as illusion are of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) from the standpoint of conventional truth, they still do not constitute existence (*vastutva*) from the point of view of highest truth. The reason is that they do not hold up to analytic examination (*vicārākṣamatvāt*). Therefore, all existences are like illusion.”<sup>...29)</sup>

<sup>(30...</sup> “The Blessed One proclaimed in the *Sandhinirmocana*[-sūtra], etc., that such things as cognition (*viññāna*) are a reality in order to have disciples (*vineya*) who adhere to arising (*utpāda*), ceasing (*nirodha*) and so forth discard nihilistic ideas. The intention of this teaching must be understood not from the viewpoint of highest truth.”<sup>...30)</sup>

Thus Kamalaśīla regards that which is acceptable only so long as it is not examined carefully (*avicāraikāramya*) as an existence in the sense of conventional truth, that is, illusion (*māyā*), mind (*citta*) etc. That is, those which are produced by dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāna*), and those which have a dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*).

This idea can be traced back to *kārikā* sixty-four in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (MAK) of Śāntarakṣita.

(27) cf. Māl P162b<sup>6-7</sup> D150a<sup>4-5</sup> (SDNS IV (118)

*de la dños po ma brtags na grags pa<sup>1</sup> ji ltar snañ ba sgyu ma bžin du brten nas byuñ ba gañ yin pa de ni gžan gyi dbaṅ gi ño bo ñid yin no // de yañ kun rdzob tu sgyu ma bžin du gžan gyi rkyen gyi dbaṅ gis skye'i / bdag ñid kho na ni ma yin pas skye ba ño bo ñid med pa ñid du rnam par gžag ste<sup>2</sup> / 1.Pom. 2.P has bžag*

(28) Bhk III. pp.6<sup>21-7</sup><sup>1</sup>

*cittam api paramārthato māyāvad anutpannam /*

(29) Bhk I. pp.218<sup>23-219</sup><sup>2</sup>

*yasha tu vidyate sa paramārthato'liko'pi samutpadyata eva / yathā māyāpratibimbādī / na ca māyādeḥ saṃvṛtyā pratītyasamutpāde paramārthato vastutvaḥ prasaṅgaḥ / tasya vicārākṣamatvāt / ataḥ sarvam eva māyopamañ jagat /*

Māl P184a<sup>8-b</sup><sup>1</sup> D169a<sup>4-5</sup>

*gañ la yod pa de ni don dam pa ño bo ñid med kyañ skye ste /<sup>1</sup> dper na sgyu ma dañ gzugs brñan la sogs pa lta bu'o // sgyu ma la sogs pa 'di rten ciñ 'brel bar 'byuñ ba yin yañ dños po ñid du thal ba ma yin te /*

1. D om.

(30) SDNS P332b<sup>1-2</sup> D287b<sup>7-288a</sup><sup>1</sup> cf. Note (9),(69). Note (121) of SDNS IV.

<sup>(31)</sup>...  
 “[We] regard that which is acceptable only so long as it is not examined carefully (*avicāraikaramya*) as being existences in the sense of conventional truth (*saṃvṛti*) which have the nature of arising (*utpāda*) and ceasing (*nirodha*) and the power to produce effects (*arthakriyāsamartha*).”<sup>(31)</sup>

On the other hand, Haribhadra employs this idea to distinguish the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādin philosophical position in terms of image (*ākāra*).

<sup>(32)</sup>...  
 “Yogācāras consider that an entity (*bhāva*) consists of cognition (*jñānātmaka*). Within [Yogācāras], [philosophical positions] differ as follows:

One regards images (*ākāra*) [of cognition (*jñāna*)] as real (*tāttvika*), the other regards them as those which are acceptable only so long as they are not examined carefully (*avicāraikaramya*) such as reflection (*pratibimba*), etc.”<sup>(32)</sup>

According to this discrimination of the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādin positions made by Haribhadra, we find that Satyākāra-vādin acknowledges that images of cognition are real even from the viewpoint of highest truth. On the other hand, Alikākāra-vādin acknowledges that images of cognition are real only from the standpoint of conventional truth (*saṃvṛtya*). It goes without saying that cognition (*viññāna* or *jñāna*) itself is real from the viewpoint of highest truth for the Satyākāra-vādin and Alikākāra-vādin. However, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra regard cognition (*viññāna*) possessing images (*ākāra*) as a conventional existence. This is also true for Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita.<sup>(33)</sup> Therefore, all of them point out that the view of the Satyākāra-vādin cannot avoid the incompatibility of unity (*eka*) and multiplicity (*aneka*) that exists between cognition (*viññāna* or *jñāna*) and images (*ākāra*) respectively.<sup>(34)</sup> Concerning the view of the Alikākāra-vādin, they point out that nondual cognition (*advaya-jñāna*) as absolute truth, which is devoid of images of the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*), cannot be proven to have a relationship of cause and effect.<sup>(35)</sup>

(31) MAV P68b<sup>2-3</sup> D70b<sup>6-7</sup>

ma brtags gcig pu<sup>1</sup> ṅams dga' zhiñ // skye dan' jig pa'i chos can pa // don byed pa dag nus rnam kyī<sup>2</sup> // ran bžin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs //

1. D has pu'i 2. D has kyis

(32) AAPV W626<sup>1-4-16</sup> V459<sup>15-16</sup>

jñānātmako bhāvo yogācārair abhyūpagamya / tatrāpi kiṃ te ākāraś tāttvikā eva kiṃ vā pratibimbādīva avicāraikaramyāḥ iti vikalpaḥ /

See pp.47-48 of Translation of AAPV of Part I.

(33) See Note (9) (10) (11) and II. *The Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika view of Mind-only (citta-mātra)* of Part II.

(34) See pp.17-21 (3.III.A. *The focus of the refutation of the view of Satyākāra-vādin*) and IV. *Conclusion* of Part I. See IV. *Jñānagarbha's refutation of the Satyākāravādin position* of Part II.

(35) See pp.23-27 (3.III. B. *The focus of the refutation of the view of the Alikākāra-vādin* and IV. *Conclusion* of

### III. The Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika Refutation of the Positions of the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādins.

#### III.1. The focus of the refutation of the views of the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādins.

The basic method and contents of refuting the views of the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādin are common to the *Satyadvayaavibhaṅga-vṛtti* (SDV) of Jñānagarbha, the *Satyadvayaavidhaṅga-ṣaṅkikā* (SDP)<sup>(36)</sup> and the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti* (MAV)<sup>(37)</sup> of Śāntarakṣita, the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-ṣaṅkikā* (MAP)<sup>(37)</sup> and the *Madhyamakāloka* (Māl)<sup>(38)</sup> of Kamalaśīla, and the *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* (AAPV)<sup>(39)</sup> of Haribhadra.

In refuting the views of the Satyākāra-vādin, they point out the incompatibility of unity (*eka*) and multiplicity (*aneka*) that exist between cognition (*viññāna*) and images (*ākāra*). Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra, then, show that the Satyākāravādin position is in contradiction with direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) since direct perception — that should be expected to be devoid of imaginary thought-construction (*vikalpa*) becomes involved with imaginary thought-construction. On the other hand, in refuting the views of Alikākāra-vādin, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra show that the nondual cognition (*advaya-jñāna*) being devoid of the images of the perceived and perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*) cannot be proven by inference (*anumāna*) such as (1) a relation of identity (*svabhāva*), (2) effect (*kārya*) or (3) non-perception (*anupalabdhi*). Moreover, it is pointed out that there is neither the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) nor a causal relation (*tadutpatti*) between the nondual cognition and unreal images (*alīkākāra*). In light of these refutations, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra cannot be considered as belonging to either the Satyākāra-vādin or the Alikākāra-vādin. This is also true for Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita.

Let us now briefly review Kamalaśīla's method involved in the refutation of the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādins discussed in his *Bhāvanākrama* (BhK). After then, I will provide the translation of the details of Kamalaśīla's refutation of the Alikākāra-vādin position in his Māl.

of Part I.

See V. Jñānagarbha's refutation of the view of Alikākāravādin of Part II.

(36) See IV. Jñānagarbha's refutation of the Satyākāravādin position and V. Jñānagarbha's refutation of the view of Alikākāravādin of Part II.

(37) See Footnote (201)~(208),(211)~(213) and (215)~(217) of Part I. and Tr of AAPV of Part II.

(38) See pp.17-27, especially Footnote (32), (52) and (53) of Part I. See III.3. Kamalaśīla's refutation of the Alikākāra-vādin position in his *madhyamakālokanāma* of Part III.

(39) See pp.46-58 (*A Translation of AAPV*) of Part I and VII. *A Translation of AAPV* of Part II.

See *Conclusion* Part I and Part II.

### III.2. Kamalaśīla's refutation of the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādin positions in his *Bhāvanākrama*.

#### III.2.1. The refutation of the Satyākāra-vādin position

<sup>(40)...</sup> “The Blessed One (*Bhagavat*) also declared [in the *Āryalanikāvatāra*].

<sup>(40-1)...</sup> color-form (*rūpa*) by no means exists in the external world, so that [actually] it is our <sup>...40-1)</sup> own mind that is seen in the external world.

Therefore, it is also not reasonable that these [immaterial things (*arūpin*)] possess unitary nature (*ekasvabhāva*) in that they manifest having manifold images (*citrākāra*) such as the color blue and having images of the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*). Manifold nature is unsuitable for unity since the latter is contrary to the former. When the unitary nature of something [immaterial] cannot be established, its manifold nature is also untenable, since manifoldness is none other than the aggregate <sup>...40)</sup> of unity.”

The reason for my regarding this description as a refutation of the Satyākāra-vādin position is that it is in accordance with the description found in the <sup>(41)</sup> Māl of Kamalaśīla and in the AAPV <sup>(42)</sup> of Haribhadra.

#### III.2.2. The refutation of the Alikākāra-vādin position

<sup>(43)...</sup> “On the other hand, if [you] acknowledge that these unreal (*alīka*) images (*ākāra*) — such as the color-form — manifest for sure, then cognition (*viññāna*) would also be unreal. The reason is that cognition cannot be separated from the nature [of unreal images]. This is because on other nature of cognition apart from illumination on its own can exist.

(40) Bhk I. p203<sup>10-16</sup>

*uktaṃ ca bhagavatā /*

<sup>(40-1)...</sup> *bahirdhā nāsti vai rūpaṃ svacittaṃ dṛśyate bahiḥ / iti /* <sup>...40 1)</sup>

*tataś ca nīlādicitrākāranirbhāsatayā grāhyagrāhakākāranirbhāsatayā naikasvabhāvā amī yuktāḥ / na caikasyā-nekarūpātā yuktimatī ekānekavirodhā / ekasya kasyacit svabhāvasyāsiddhāv anekarūpātāpy ayuktimatī ekasamūharūpatvād anekasya /*

(40-1) LAS X-489 ab

*vahirdhā nāsti vai rūpaṃ svacittaṃ dṛśyate bahiḥ /*

(41) See pp<sup>17-21</sup> and Footnote (32) of Part I.

(42) See p48 [II-1-A] of Part I.

(43) Bhk I. pp.203<sup>16-204</sup><sup>2</sup>

*athavā tatvālikā evāmi rūpādaya ākārah pratibhāsanta ity abhyupagamyate / tadā viññānam apy alikaṃ prāpnoti / viññānasya tatsvarūpavyatirekāt / na hi svayaṃ prakāśamānarūpatāvyatirekenānyad viññānasya rūpaṃ asti / svayaṃ ca na nirbhāsante rūpādayaḥ / teṣāṃ ca viññānasvarūpāpannānām alikatve sarvaṃ eva viññānam alikam abhyupetaṃ syāt / tasmān mayopamaṃ ca viññānam ity uktaṃ bhagavatā / tasmād ekānekasvabhāvaśūnyatvena paramārthatō 'likā evāmi sarvabhāvā iti nīcitam etat /*

No other nature [of images] such as the color-form [apart from illumination on its own] can exist. If these [images] which are involved in the nature of cognition are unreal, it would be acknowledged that all cognition is also unreal.

[Conclusion:] That is why the Blessed One proclaimed that “cognition is like illusion (*māyā*)” Therefore, it is ascertained that all these existences (*sarvabhāva*) [viz., of both material things (*rūpin*) and immaterial things (*arūpin*)] are definitely unreal (*alika*) from the viewpoint of highest truth since they are devoid of intrinsic nature of unity and multiplicity (*ekāneka-svabhāva-śūnyatva*).<sup>...43)</sup>”

### III-3. Kamalaśīla’s refutation of the theory of the Alikākāra-vādin of the Yogācāra School in his *Madhyamakāloka*.

[Objection of the Alikākāra-vādin:]

<sup>(44...</sup> The distinctions of [the *lakṣanas* of] arising (*utpāda*), etc., are established by means of cognition (*jñāna*) which manifests as a dichotomy [between the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhaka*)], not only by self-cognition (*svasamvedana*) [as a nondual cognition (*advaya jñāna*) which is devoid of the images of the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*)].

As the manifestation of dichotomy is also unreal (*alika*), that which has the nature established by it is also none other than unreal.<sup>...44)</sup>

[Answer of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika:]

<sup>(45...</sup> If all existence which has the nature of arising (*utpāda*), etc., is established by way of manifesting as a cognition which is unreal, how can it exist from the point of view of highest truth (*paramārthatas*)?

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See III. B. *The focus of the refutation of the view of the Alikākāra-vādin* and Footnote (52), (53) of Part I. See Conclusion of III.3. of Part III and II.2.B.2. ~ II.2.B.2.3. of SDNS IV.

(44)~(60) Mal P180b<sup>4</sup>-182b<sup>8</sup> D165b<sup>6</sup>-167b<sup>7</sup>

[Objection of the Alikākāra-vādin:]

<sup>(44...</sup>  
gañ yañ skye ba la sogs pa'i rnam par dbye ba ni gñis su snañ ba'i šes pa kho nas byed kyi / rañ rig pa tsam  
gyis ni ma yin no // gñis su snañ ba yañ brdzun pa'i phyir des rnam par gzag pa'i no bo yañ brdzun pa kho  
na'o<sup>...44)</sup>

[Answer of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika:]

<sup>(45...</sup>  
šes bya ba la sogs pa smras pa de la yañ brjod par bya ste / gal te chos thams cad<sup>1</sup> skye ba la sogs pa'i chos ñid  
šes pa brdzun pa'i no bor snañ bas rnam par gzag<sup>2</sup> pa'i no bo yin na ni de ji ltar 'di dag don dam par yod par  
'gyur / <sup>(D166a)</sup> gñis su snañ ba yañ brdzun pa ñid yin na ni šes pa'i no bo gañ don dam par srid par 'gyur ba  
gžan ci žig lus / šes pa de kho na ñid gzuñ ba dañ 'dzin pa'i rnam pa dañ bral ba gžan ni tshu rol mthoñ ba  
rnams kyi yañ dag par myoñ ba med de / thams cad de kho na ñid mthoñ ba<sup>3</sup> ñid du thal bar 'gyur ro // de  
ni rjes su dpag pa'i sgo nas nes pa yañ ma yin te / de lta bu'i rtags ñid ma grub pa'i phyir ro //<sup>...45)</sup>

If the manifestation of the dichotomy [of cognition] is also unreal, how can the other kind of cognition, which is able to exist from the viewpoint of highest truth, exist? This true cognition which is devoid of the images of the perceived and the perceiver cannot be completely perceived by ordinary people. [If it were possible for them,] everyone would attain the truth.

[Self-cognition as nondual cognition] cannot be proven by means of inference (*anumāṇa*), for such a logical reason (*hetu*) is inadmissible (*asiddha*).<sup>...45)</sup>

This is because:

1. Inference which is formulated with a logical mark of identity (*svabhāva-līṅga*) cannot be established because the very identity [between self-cognition as a nondual cognition and its internal object] must be proven.<sup>...46)</sup>
2. Inference which is formulated with the logical mark of effect (*kārya*) cannot be established because it is impossible that something nondual (*advaya*) and anything else can have a cause and effect relationship with each other, and because [nondual cognition] cannot be ascertained by means of a sense organ (*indriya*). There can be no other effect (*kārya*) independent of [nondual cognition], for according to your theory, [a self-cognition of] nonduality would be taken as an effect, however [self-cognition] itself should [first] be proven to have a cause and effect relationship. This also cannot be proven by means of a valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). Just as the manifestation of dichotomy [viz., images of the perceived and the perceiver] is equivalent to the horns of a rabbit [viz., non-existent] [according to your theory,] it cannot be an effect.

How can the cause and effect relationship be proven by means of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and nonperception (*anupalabdhi*)? This is because nothing can be perceived by means of a cognition of nonduality from the point of view of highest truth.<sup>...47)</sup>

- 
1. <sup>(46...</sup> 'di ltar re žig rañ bžin gyi rtags las byuñ bas rjes su dpag pa ni mi srid de<sup>4</sup> / de'i rañ bžin ñid bsgrub par bya ba yin pa'i phyir ro // <sup>...16)</sup>
  2. <sup>(47...</sup> 'bras<sup>5</sup> bu'i rtags kyañ ma yin te / gñis su med pa dan<sup>6</sup> 'ga' yañ lhan cig rgyu dan 'bras bu'i <sup>(p181a)</sup> dños por ma grub pa'i phyir te / de ni dbañ pos mi sod pa'i phyir ro // de las ma gtogs pa'i 'bras bu gžan yod pa yañ ma yin te / 'di ltar khyed kyī ltar na gñis su med pa de kho na 'bras bur 'gyur ba žig na de ñid bsgrub par bya ba ñid kyī skabs yin pa'i phyir de yañ tshad mas grub pa ma yin no // gñis su snañ ba gañ yin pa de ni ri boñ gi rva dan 'dra ba'i phyir 'bras bu ma yin no // gañ gis na mñon sum dan mi dmigs pas sgrub pa rgyu dan 'bras bu'i dños po 'grub par 'gyur ba don dam par gñis su med pa'i ses pas kyañ 'ga' yañ 'dzin pa med do // <sup>...17)</sup>



3. Nonperception (*anupalabdhi*) is not that which proves the reality [of nondual cognition] because it is that which proves negation (*pratiśedha*).<sup>...48)</sup>

3-a.

[Objection:] There is surely a valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) that can prove [the reality of nondual cognition].

This is because:

[Major:] Whenever A is contrary to B by nature, A is devoid of B. e.g. warmth which is contrary to cold is devoid of cold.

[Minor:] The nature of cognition [viz., reality] is contrary to the duality [images of the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*).]

[Conclusion:] The nature of cognition is devoid of duality.]

[This inference] is based on the principle of the perception of what is incompatible with a pervader (*vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhi*). The logical reason (*hetu*) in this case does not lead to the fallacy of the impossibility of the basis (*āśrayāsiddhi*).

A subject (*charmin*) that perceives images such as pleasure and displeasure, that is, cognition with the nature of perception is, in general, accepted. [The logical reason (*hetu*) [of this inference] is also not inadmissible (*asiddha*), for the image of the perceiver (*grāhakākāra*) which is constructed depending upon the image of the perceived (*grāhyākāra*) is also devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) as the image of the perceived (*grāhyākāra*) is devoid of intrinsic nature because it is devoid of the nature of either unity (*eka*) or multiplicity (*aneka*).<sup>...49)</sup>

- 3-b.<sup>(50)...</sup> All existence does not come to be non-existent as a result of this, for [the images of the

3. <sup>(48)...</sup> *mi dmigs pa yañ dgag pa sgrub pa yin pa'i phyir yod pa sgrub pa'i skabs ma yin no // gal te 'di sñam du* <sup>...48)</sup>

3—a. [ Objection : ]

<sup>(49)...</sup> *de sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma ni yod pa ñid de / 'di ltar 'ga' zig gañ gi ño bo ñid dan 'gal ba de ni de'i ño bos dben pa yin pa yin te / dper na grañ ba'i ño bo la gnod pa'i dro ba grañ ba'i ño bo ñid kyis dben pa lta bu yin la / rtogs pa'i ño bo'i chos can yañ gñis kyi ño bo ñid la gnod pa yin pas khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pa yin no // glan tshigs gñi ma grub pa yañ ma yin te / spyir dga' ba dan mi dga' ba la sogs pa'i rnam pa ñams su myoñ ba'i chos can rnam par ses pa zes bya ba rtogs pa'i ño bo grub pa'i phyir ro // ran gi ño bo ma grub pa ñid kyan ma yin te / gzuñ ba'i rnam pa gcig dan du ma'i ño bo ñid dan bral ba'i sgo nas ño bo ñid med pa <sup>(D166b)</sup> ñid kyis de la ltos nas rab tu brtags pa'i 'dzin pa'i rnam pa yañ ño bo ñid med pa'i phyir ro //* <sup>...49)</sup>

3—b.

<sup>(50)...</sup> *thams cad dños po med par yañ thal ba yañ ma yin te / byed pa po dan las kyi ño bo kho na la bltos<sup>a</sup> pa tsam las ñe bar brtags pa'i ño bo yin pa'i phyir brdzun pa 'ba' zig tu zad kyī / bdag ñid ni ma yin no sñam du sems* <sup>...50)</sup>  
na

perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*) are none other than unreal (*alīka*) and nonsubstantial in that they are conceptually constructed depending upon only the [conventional] relation of agent (*kartr*) and action (*karman*).<sup>...50)</sup>

[Answer:]<sup>(51)...</sup> Your statement is not reasonable.

3-a-1. If you want, in general, to prove only that [cognition] is devoid of duality (viz., *grāhya-grāhaka*) from the viewpoint of highest truth (*paramārtha*) [viz., as absolute negation (*prasajya-rūpa*)], then it would only prove what is already proven (*siddha-sādhana*). We [Yogācāra-mādhyamika] also advocate that [cognition] is detached (*vivikta*) from any intrinsic nature because this duality is unreal (*alīka*) from the viewpoint of highest truth.<sup>...51)</sup>

3-a-2.<sup>(52)...</sup> If you want to prove that an individual cognition is devoid of images (*ākāra*) from the viewpoint of highest truth, the relative negation (*paryudāsa-rūpa*), it also would only prove what is already proven (*siddhasādhana*). This is because we [Yogācāra-mādhyamika] also advocate that all kinds of cognition are non-existent from the point of view of highest truth and devoid of dual real images since all existences are non-arising (*anutpatti*) from the point of view of highest truth.<sup>...52)</sup>

3-a-3.<sup>(53)...</sup> If you want to prove that the subject (*dharmin*) of cognition (*jñāna*) is devoid of dual images [viz., *grāhya-grāhakākāra*] and that it is a real existence [at the same time], the logical reasoning [of this inference] leads to inconclusiveness (*anaikāntika*) because the invariable concomitance (*anvaya*) with regard to the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) would not be proven. The reason why is that it cannot be proven from the point of view of high-

[ Answer : ]

<sup>(51)...</sup> de yañ rigs pa ma yin te /

3—a—1.

gal te spyir don dam par gñis kyes dben pa tsam žig sgrub par 'dod na ni de'i tshe grub pa sgrub pa ñid de /  
kho bo cag kyañ don <sup>(p181b)</sup> dam par gñis brdzun pa'i phyir dben par 'dod pa ñid do //<sup>...51)</sup>

3—a—2.

<sup>(52)...</sup> 'on te ma yin pa'i ño bo'i<sup>9</sup> don dam pa'i<sup>10</sup> sgo nas rnam par šes pa ñid kyi rnam pa dañ bral ba ñid du sgrub  
par 'dod na ni de'i tshe yañ grub pa sgrub pa ñid de / kho bo cag kyañ don dam par chos thams cad ma skyes  
pa'i phyir šes pa thams cad don dam par med pa la gñis kyi rnam pa yañ dag pa dañ bral bar 'dod pa'i phyir  
ro //<sup>...52)</sup>

3—a—3.

<sup>(53)...</sup> 'on te šes pa žes bya ba'i chos can la gñis dañ bral ba ñid dañ / dños po'i ño bo ñid gñi ga yañ sgrub par 'dod  
na ni de'i tshe dpe la rjes su 'gro ba ma grub pas gtan tshigs ma nes pa ñid yin te / phyi'i don gyi ño bo gran  
ba dañ / tsha ba dag yañ dag par ma grub pa'i phyir ro //<sup>...53)</sup>

est truth that an external object (*bāhyārtha*) possesses the two natures of cold and warmth [at the same time].<sup>...53)</sup>

3-a-4. It is not contradictory that [a unitary cognition (*eka-jñāna*) is accompanied by both images of the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*)] since the two natures of cognizing and manifestation appear in it. Therefore, the [homogeneous] example (*drstānta*) [of this inference] is devoid of the inferable property (*sādhya*).<sup>...54)</sup>

3-a-5. If [Alikākāra-vādin] think that when the nondual cognition (*advaya-jñāna*) can be proven, then the nature of cognition [as a reality] is also spontaneously proven, this notion of yours would be wrong, for the intrinsic connection (*pratibandha*) is absent from [the nonduality and the reality of cognition].<sup>...55)</sup>

In this case, how can the intrinsic connection between what is devoid of duality and its own existence be established?

The reason is that there is no means of valid cognition that excludes the logical reason of the contradiction of the inferable property (*sādhya-viparyaya-bādhaka-pramāṇa*) and any kind of [homogeneous and heterogeneous] examples cannot be established. [This logical reason (*hetu*)] leads to inconclusiveness (*anaikāntika*) with regard to relations such as those between the son of a barren woman and the dual [images of the perceived and the perceiver].<sup>...55)</sup>

3-a-6. The [previous] duality (*dvaya*) cannot be established through the [following] duality, for then there would be an infinite series (*anavasthā*). Another subject (*dharmīn*) which

3—a—4.

<sup>(54)...</sup>  
śes pa gcig la yañ śes pa dan snañ ba'i no bo dag snañ pa'i phyir mi 'gal ba ñid yod pas dpe bsgrub pas ston  
pa ñid kyañ yin no //<sup>...54)</sup>

3—a—5.

<sup>(55)...</sup>  
jñ<sup>11</sup> ste śes pa gñis dan bral ba ñid grub na śugs kyis dños po'i no bo ñid kyañ 'grub par 'gyur ro sñam du sems  
na / blo gros 'di ni ñan pa yin te / 'brel pa med pa'i phyir ro // 'di la gañ la gñis dan bral ba de gdon mi za  
bar yañ dag<sup>12</sup> pa'i dños po yod do źes bya ba'i 'brel pa 'di ci žig yod de / de bzlog na gnod pa can gyi tshad  
ma med pa'i phyir dan / de lta bu'i dpe ma grub pa'i phyir ro // mo gśam gyi bu la sogs pa dan / gñis po de  
ñid kyis ma ñes par 'gyur ba'i yañ phyir ro //<sup>...55)</sup>

3-a-6

<sup>(56)...</sup>  
thug pa meb par 'gyur ba'i phyir gñis la gñis po gźan yod pa ni ma yin no // gran ba la sogs pa'i reg pas dben  
pa'i dro ba la sogs pa'i no bo bźim du gñis kyi no bo las ma gtogs pa gañ la de dan bral ba ñid du<sup>13</sup> bsgrub par  
'gyur<sup>(1167a)</sup> ba rtogs pa'i no bo ñid spyi'i no bo chos can gźan ni yod pa ma yin te / gñis po'i bdag ñid kho na  
rtogs pa'i no bo yin pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar gañ žig bdag ñid kho na rab tu gsal žiñ gsal ba gźan la mi bltos<sup>14</sup>  
pa de ni rtogs pa'i mtshan ñid yin no // lus dan // sa dan / ri dan / chu bo dan / rgva mtsho la sogs pa  
rnam pa sna tshogs<sup>(P182a)</sup> phyi rol gyi no bo ñid du mdun na snañ ba'i don gañ yin pa de ni bdag ñid kho nas  
gsal ba'i phyir rtogs pa'i no bo ñid las mi 'da' bar 'jug go //<sup>...56)</sup>

does not possess a dual nature like the nature of warmth which is devoid of the touch of cold, etc., and which possesses the nature of knowledge, a universal feature (*sāmānyarūpa*), does not exist. This is because the nature of the duality is none other than the nature of knowledge.

The reason is as follows: knowledge is characterized by its nature in that it is illuminated by itself and that it does not depend upon any other illumination (*prakāśa*). As the various images (*ākāra*) which manifest in our presence as elements characteristic of the external world such as body, earth, mountain, river and ocean are illuminated by themselves, they do not transcend the range of knowledge.

[Therefore, images are illuminated by themselves just as knowledge<sup>...56)</sup>

3-a-7. <sup>(57)...</sup> When it (viz., the nondual cognition), too, operates in an unreal (*alīka*) locale [viz., latent impression (*vāsanā*) which causes error (*bhrānti*)], [the images (*ākāra*)] operate as if they embrace the nature of knowledge just as our own body goes together with our sweetheart. Accordingly, how could that which has been refuted [viz., the nondual cognition] be revived when it meets something with an incorrect dichotomy [viz., the images of the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*)]. [That is to say, as the images are unreal, the nondual cognition is unreal.] If the dichotomy and the sweetheart [viz., cognition], having just the same relation of identity (*tādātmya*), part from each other, it is impossible that only [the nondual cognition] becomes the subject (*dharmīn*), without meeting the other [viz., images]. That is why [the logical reason (*hetu*) of this inference] leads necessarily to the fallacy of the impossibility of the basis (*āśrayāsiddhi*).

In the same way, the Sautrāntika, too, do not assert that a cognition (*jñāna*) possesses a twofold nature [viz., *grāhya-grāhakākāra*] in the true sense. This is because that which does not have any sections [viz., cognition] is contradictory to [anything of a dual nature]. Therefore, if you try to prove that [cognition] is a nonduality (*advaya*), what

3-a-7

<sup>(57)...</sup>  
de yañ brdzun pa'i ño bo ñid kyi<sup>15</sup> rigs kyi khyim du 'jug par spyod pa na ran gi lus dan khyad par med par  
spyod pa'i mdza' mo lta bur rtogs pa'i ño bo ñid dan / kun tu 'khyud pa ltar spyod pas dam pa ma yin pa'i  
gñis po dan phrad bas sun phyuñ ba'i bdag ñid 'di yid brtan du ga la ruñ / de'i bdag ñid lta bu'i gñis kyi ño  
bo'i mdza' bo dan bral na gan gis na 'di gžan dan mi phrad<sup>16</sup> ciñ 'ba' žig chos can du 'gyur ba'i gnas ni  
gan du yañ mi 'thad do / de'i phyir gtan tshigs gži ma grub pa kho na yin no / mdo sde pa la sogs pa yañ yañ  
dag par na šes pa gñis kyi ño bo ñid du mi 'dod pa kho na ste / cha šas med pa la de 'gal ba'i phyir ro // de'i  
phyir de gñis su med pa'i ño bo ñid du sgrub pa yañ ci žig rab tu bsgrub<sup>17</sup> par 'gyur te / phyi'i don kyañ de  
dan mi 'gal ba'i phyir ro // gal te tshad ma gžan gyi sgo nas phyi'i dños po sal bar brjod na ni de dan 'dra ba  
ñid du rnam par šes pa la yañ de ci ste ñe bar mi brjod /<sup>...57)</sup>

on earth would be proven? This is because the objects of the external world, too are not contrary to [nondual cognition] [in that both of them are devoid of the dual images of subject and object.]

If you assert that the objects of the external world are denied by other means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), how could the cognition (*viññāna*), which is equal to that [viz., the object of external world] in nature, be also denied [by other means of valid cognition]<sup>...57)</sup>?

- 3-b-1. <sup>(58...</sup> It is also surely contradictory to immediate experience (*anubhava*) that [the dual images of the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*)] are nothing more than unreal (*alīka*), as you have asserted, because they are a conceptual thought-construction based only upon the relation of an agent (*kartr*) and his action (*karman*). The reason is that although you [viz., Alikākākāra-vādin] assert that cognition is devoid of the dual [images of the perceived and the perceiver] from the viewpoint of highest truth, still there are various images such as the color blue included in the mind (*citta*) which are evidently perceived as if they are manifest in the external world (*bahir*) and independent (*vicchinna*) from [mind]. This is true not only for ordinary people who do not notice the specific relationship (*viśeṣa*) in their conception of agent (*kartr*) and action (*karman*) but also for [the saint] whose mind is devoid of error (*doṣa*) in his knowledge.

If the varied existent [images (*ākāra*)] are conceived of only by depending upon [the relation of the agent and action], their idiosyncrasy (*viśeṣa*) would not be obviously manifested in [the minds] of even ordinary people [, for they do not notice the relation of the agent and action.]<sup>...58)</sup>

- 3-c. <sup>(59...</sup> If you acknowledge that the immediate experience (*anubhava*) which clearly manifests the specific properties [of images] is surely unreal (*alīka*) because these images (*ākāra*) are aggregates which are qualified by time and space, then when you seek emancipation

3-b-1.

<sup>(58...</sup> *gañ yañ byed pa po dan las kyi dños po kho na la bltos*<sup>18</sup> *pa las rab tu brtags pa'i ño bo yin pa'i phyir brdzun pa 'ba' zīg tu zad kyi zēs smras pa gañ yin pa de yañ ñams su myoñ ba dan 'gal ba kho na'o // 'di ltar khyed ni yañ dag par na rnam par šes pa gñis su med pa'i rnam pa kho nar 'dod la / sñon po la sogs pa sems kyi rnam pa sna tshogs*<sup>19</sup> *phyi rol ñid du rnam par chad par snañ ba yañ byis pa byed pa po dan las kyi tha sñad du*<sup>20</sup> *bye brag tu mi šes pa rnam kyis kyañ rtog*<sup>21</sup> *pa'i skyon dan bral ba'i sems la yañ*<sup>22</sup> *gsal rab tu yañ dag par myoñ ño // de'i* <sup>(D167b)</sup> *sna tshogs kyi dños po ltos*<sup>23</sup> *pa tsam las ñe bar brtags pa yin na ni bye brag de byis pa yan chad la gsal rab tu snañ bar yañ mi* <sup>(P182b)</sup> *'gyur ro //*

3-c.

<sup>(59...</sup> *gal te khyed rnam pa'i tshogs yul dan*<sup>24</sup> *dus kyi gnas skabs ñes pas tha dad pa de ltar gsal rab tu ñams su myoñ*

(*mokṣa*), why are you attached to that particular of knowledge, which devoid of the dual [images of the perceived and the perceiver] are unverifiable, is itself surely characterized by detachment (*vivikta-svabhāva*). Is there any other greed (*rāga*) left besides this attachment? [If you are attached to such knowledge], the wise have been astonished for a long time [by such a foolish idea], just like one who regards a tail coming out of a small window as the large body of an elephant. So, cut off this attachment by the sharp edge of a sword of wisdom for yourself.

[Conclusion:]

If the nature of cognition (*jñāna*) is real (*satya*), there is neither the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) nor causation (*tadutpatti*) between a thing which truly manifests and images (*ākāra*) having an unreal nature. This is because it is incompatible for the real (*satya*) and the unreal (*alīka*), which are mutually exclusive (*paraṣpara-parihāra-sthiti-lakṣaṇa*), to have the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) and this does not explain how the unreal is produced from something. Even though it (viz., the unreal) is produced by something, the two (viz., cause and effect) cannot be produced as a relation of identity (*tādātma*)

ba de yañ brdzun pa ñid du khas len na ni de'i tshé thar pa 'dod pa khyed rtogs pa'i no bo gñis kyi no bos dben pa mi mñon pa'i bdag ñid la yañ dben pa'i no bo ñid du mñon par zhen cin<sup>25</sup> chags pa gzan ci zig yod de / glan po lus chen po skar khuñ sin tu chud du'i gseb nas byuñ ba'i mjug ma la<sup>26</sup> 'thogs<sup>27</sup> pa gañ yin pa dan 'dra bar mkhas pa rnams sin tu yun rin por ya mtshan rmad du 'dzin par byed do // de lta bas na bdag ñid kyiś ses rab kyi ral gri sin tu rnon pos chags pa de chod la 'or cig /

[Conclusion:]

śes pa'i bdag ñid bden pa'i no bo de la ni gañ gis na de la de ltār gsal rab tu snañ bar 'grur ba<sup>28</sup> brdzun pa'i bdag ñid kyi rnam pa rnams de'i bdag ñid dan / de las byuñ ba'i mtshan ñid kyi 'brel ba<sup>29</sup> 'ga'yañ med de / <sup>30</sup> bden pa dan mi bden pa phan tshun spañs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid dag ni de'i bdag ñid du 'gal ba'i phyir la / mi bden pa yañ gañ las kyañ skye bar khas mi len pa'i phyir ro // de skye na yañ 'di dag dus gcig tu de'i bdag ñid du snañ bar ni mi 'gyur te / rgyu dan 'bras bu dag ni dus dan no bo ñid tha dad pa yin pa'i phyir ro // 'bre' pa med par snañ bar ñes pa'añ rigs pa ma yin te / ha cañ thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // de lta bas na gdon mi za bar rtogs pa'i no bo dan tha mi dad pa'i ran gi no bo'i rnam pa mi bden pa'i bdag ñid rnams snañ bar khas blañs pa'i phyir de'i bdag ñid kyi<sup>31</sup> mtshan ñid kyiś 'brel bar<sup>32</sup> khas blañ dgos so // de'i phyir gñi ga'añ brdzun pa ñid du gyur to // de lta ma yin na ni ji ltar brdzun pa'i rnam pa rnams dan lhan cig rtogs pa'i no bo ñid de'i bdag ñid du ñams su myoñ bar 'gyur / de bas na bden pa la mñon par zhen pa'i žags pa 'di 'or cig / 1 kyi P 2 bžag P 3 kho na D 4 do P 5 'bas P 6 ni P 7 The meaning of this world cannot be understood. 8 ltos D 9 bo P 10 par P 11 ci P 12 pa P 13 P om. 14 ltos D 15 kyiś D 16 'phrad P 17 sgrub P 18 ltos D 19 kyi D 20 D om. 21 rtogs D 22 P om. 23 bltos P 24 P has / 25 P has / 26 D om. 27 thogs D 28 P has / 29 pa D 30 D has // 31 P om. 32 par D

(45) cf. SDNS IV (135), (47) cf. SDNS IV (133), (56) cf. SDNS IV (136) and MAP P132a<sup>5-6</sup> D124a<sup>6-7</sup>, (60) cf. SDNS IV (132) and (137).

at the same time. This is because cause and effect are different from each other with respect to time and their own nature.

[Accordingly there is no causation (*tadutpatti*) between a real nondual cognition (*advaya-jñāna*) and an unreal image (*ākāra*).] It is unreasonable that the manifestation [of images] is certified in spite of no relation between the two. Such would be over reduction-istic (*atiprasaṅga*). You should surely acknowledge a relation of identity (*tādātmya*) between them, since the manifestation of unreal images [in the present case], which do not differ from the nature of cognition, are acknowledged. Thus both of them become unreal (*alīka*). Otherwise [if there is not a relation of identity between cognition and images], how can an unreal image (*ākāra*) and the nature of cognition be perceived as an identity? Consequently cut this string of attachment to [only nondual cognition] as real.  
...60)

#### IV. Explanation of the term, “Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika” and its philosophical characteristics in the *lTa ba'i khyad par* of Ye šes sde.

We cannot find the term “Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika” in the texts of their own composition.<sup>(61)</sup> Then, who is the first person who used this term? It is said that Ye šes sde (Jñānasena, c. The beginning of 9c) coined the term when he composed the *lTa ba'i khyad par* (Tkh) (the distinction of philosophical position). In that text he assigned Bhāvaviveka (c. A.D.500-570) to the Sautrāntika-mādhyaṃika school and Śāntarakṣita (c. A.D.725-788) to the Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika school.<sup>(62)</sup> In addition to this fact, with other translators he translated texts of this tradition into Tibetan such as *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-kārikā* (SDK), *-vṛtti* (SDV) of Jñānagarbha

(61)

It is well known that the terms “Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika” and “Sautrāntika-mādhyaṃika” as well as the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika with regard to branches within the Mādhyaṃika were created by Tibetan Buddhist scholars. In spite of this, according to recent research, the terms “Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika” and “Sautrāntika-mādhyaṃika” can also be found in one Indian commentary, that is, the *Pañcakramatikā Kramārthaprakāśikā* of Lakṣmī. However, Lakṣmī, who was a nun of Kaśmīr, was active about the beginning of eleventh century, about two centuries after Ye šes sbe. That is why Lakṣmī cannot be considered as the creator of the terms “Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika” and “Sautrāntika-mādhyaṃika”.

See BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA' of Katsumi Mimaki, pp.42-43.

(62)

It may be unsuitable to use the terms the “Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika” and the “Sautrāntika-mādhyaṃika” here, because instead of these terms Ye šes sbe employs the terms the “*rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma*” and the “*mDo sde (spyod pa'i) dbu ma*” respectively in his *lTa ba'i khyad par*. About the examination of origin of the terms of the “*rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma*” and the “*mDo sde (spyod pa'i) dbu ma*” themselves as

(c. A.D. 700–760), *Satyadvayaavidhaṅga-pañjika* (SDP), *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-kārikā* (MAK), *-vṛtti* (MAV) of Śāntarakṣita and *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-pañjikā* (MAP), *Bhāvanākrama* (BhK) of Kamalaśīla (c. A.D.740–795).

In the light of this fact I believe that it is important to examine his view on the distinction of philosophical positions in the *lTa ba'i khad par*. Herein we find, “What are the two tenets<sup>(63)</sup> of the Middle doctrine (*dbu ma*)?”

Formerly, although Ācārya Nāgārjuna, who is an erudite master of Middle doctrine, and Āryadeva composed philosophical treatises on the Middle doctrine, still there did not exist two branches [of the Middle doctrine]. Later Ācārya Asaṅga and Vasubandhu composed commentaries on a theory which demonstrates that all existence is a product of mere consciousness, establishing that no objects of the external world exist; instead, consciousness manifests as an [external] object. They, then also advocates that a purified nondual cognition (*advayañāna*) exists even from the viewpoint of highest truth (*paramārthataḥ*). After that, Bhavya [viz., Bhāvaviveka] who was called “learned master” of the Middle doctrine” was a follower of the doctrine of Ācārya Nāgārjuna and arrived at the truth of the doctrine. Having refuted the theory of mere consciousness, he wrote the *Prajñāpradīpa* which was a commentary on Ācārya Nāgārjuna’s *Madhyamaka-kārikā* and *Madhyamakahrdaya*. In the medieval period, in conformity with Ācārya Asaṅga’s philosophical treatise on meditative practice (*yogācāra*) which illustrated the theory of mere consciousness, the scholar Śāntarakṣita composed a philosophical treatise on the Middle doctrine called the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* where he stated [his view]: while supporting the same theory of mere consciousness as that [of Asaṅga’s philosophical treatise] from the standpoint of conventional truth, he nonetheless demonstrated that consciousness (*viññāna*) is also devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) from the viewpoint of highest truth.

[That is why] there were born two kinds of philosophical treatises on the Middle doctrine whose tenets slightly differ from each other. Accordingly, [I] call the philosophy described in the work of Ācārya Bhavya the Middle doctrine based on Scripture (*mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma*), while [I] call the other philosophy in the work of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita the Middle doctrine in conformity with meditative practice [from the standpoint of conventional truth] (the *rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma*).

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they occur in *lTa ba'i khyad par*, please refer to *lTa ba'i khyad par* における中観理解について of Matsumoto Shiro (松本史朗). in Sotoshū Kenkyūinkenkyusei Kenkyūkiyō (曹洞宗研究員研究生研究紀要) No.13 (1981).  
<sup>(63)</sup> Tkh pp.32<sup>8</sup>–33<sup>31</sup>



With reference to [the philosophy in the works] of Ācārya Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, it is in conformity with the teachings of the *Āryaprajñāpāramitā*, etc. [They advocate the following:]

Although existence, in general, is produced from the standpoint of conventional truth (*saṃvṛtyā*) just like an illusion (*māyā*) because it is of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpanna*), still it is not reasonable that existence is produced from itself, from others, from both (itself and others) or from no cause from the viewpoint of highest truth (*paramārthatas*) in that it is devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*).

That is how the two kinds of the Middle doctrine are based on [the philosophy of Ācārya Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva]. Among the two, the tenets of the *rNal 'bror spyob pa'i dbu ma* say,

[Our philosophy] is in conformity with the theory of the proponents of mere consciousness (*viññānavādin*) from the standpoint of conventional truth. The reason is that when an object is perceived by cognition (*viññāna*), the object itself is none other than the nature of cognition. Therefore it is possible that [cognition as an object and cognition itself] are associated with each other. That is why [we] can perceive [the object as a cognition] by means of self-cognition (*svasāmvitti*). On the contrary, if one acknowledges that an object is independent of [cognition], then it is impossible that one perceives [the object] in that there is no relationship between [object] and cognition (*jñāna*). As to that which manifests being dependently originated in the external world, for instance, it can be compared to the case of dream where one sees the mind itself when one sees something, despite the fact that there is no object [in the external world].

It is also proclaimed in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*:

color-form (*rūpa*) does not exist in the external world, it is our own mind manifesting in the external world.

It cannot be established that that mind is an existence in that it is devoid of the intrinsic nature of unity (*eka*) or multiplicity (*aneka*).

[Objection:] What is the reason?

[Answer:] The reason is that if an object (*viṣaya*) is none other than the nature of cognition (*viññāna*), the mind would also come to be multiple just as objects are varied and multiple. In the same way, as mind cannot be multiple so objects cannot be multiple. That is why one must comprehend that objects in the external world are non-existent according to the theory of mind-only (*citta-mātra*). According to the tenet of the Middle doct-

rine, one should understand that that mind is also devoid of an eternal self (*anātman*).

It is also declared in the *Āryalokottarapāṇḍita*: Oh! Son of the Victorious One (*jinaputra*). [The Bodhisattva] comprehends that everything in existence that belongs to the three worlds (*tridhātuka*) and the three periods (*trikālyā*) [of the past, the present and the future] is a product of the mind-only (*cittamātra*). And then he comprehends that that mind is also devoid of an end and a middle (*anantamadhyatayā*).

It is also proclaimed in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*:

Depending upon mind-only (*citta-mātra*), the Yogin does not imagine an object in the external world. Observing truth, he should transcend mind-only. After transcending mind-only, he should transcend non-manifestation [of the perceived and the perceiver]. The Yogin who thus abides in non-manifestation beholds the great vehicle (*mahāyāna*).

That is why I explain that the tenets of this Middle doctrine [viz., the *rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma*] is not contrary to [the teachings of] the Scripture.

On the other hand, the Middle doctrine based on the Scripture (*mDo sde dbu ma*) can be described as:

Being in conformity with the tenet which is created by Ācārya Nāgārjuna, he [viz., Bhavya] demonstrates that all existence in the external world and in the internal world is dependently originated (*pratītyasamutpanna*). Then, [he] advocates that although [all things] are existent like illusion (*māyā*) since they are produced from cause (*hetu*) and condition (*pratyaya*) from the standpoint of conventional truth (*samvṛtyā*), still they are non-arising based on the four kinds of logical reasoning that it is not reasonable that they are produced from themselves, from others, from both (themselves and others) and from no cause from the viewpoint of highest truth (*paramārthatas*).<sup>...63)</sup>

Thus, according to Ye šes sde, the philosophy of the *rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma* can be defined as follows:

it is in conformity with the theory of mere consciousness or mind-only from the standpoint of conventional truth. However, consciousness or cognition (*viññāna*) is also devoid of any intrinsic nature from the viewpoint of highest truth. This definition of the philosophy of the *rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma* can be traced back to texts themselves of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika scholars; that is to say, Jñānagarbha, Śāntaraṣita, Kamalaśīla, Haribhadra as I have already shown.<sup>(61)</sup> Finally, as to the tenets of the *mDo sde (spyod pa'i) dbu ma* which is described above, it is in conformity with following description if the *Madhyamaka-hṛdayavṛtti* of Bhāvaviveka.

<sup>(65)</sup>...

"We acknowledge that all things are existent like illusions since they are produced from cause (*hetu*) and condition (*pratyaṃya*) being correlative with [their effect]."<sup>(65)</sup>

This is why we can safely say that Ye šes sde's definitions of the theory of the *rNal 'byor spyob pa'i dbu ma* and the *mDo sde (spyod pa'i) dbu ma* are both tenable and correct. This judgement is supported by the fact that almost all texts which advocate the philosophies of the two schools of the Mādhyaṃika were translated into Tibetan by Ye šes sde.

## V. Conclusion

1) Kamalaśīla as well as Śāntarakṣita acknowledges the theory of mind-only (*citta-mātra*) from the standpoint of conventional truth and, moreover, does not admit any independent external object other than the mind (*citta*) even in terms of conventional truth. This philosophical position can also be ascertained in Kamalaśīla's *Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāva-siddhi* (SDNS).<sup>(66)</sup>

This position can also be applied to other philosophers of the Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika school, such as Jñānagarbha and Haribhadra.

2) The theory of mind-only which is acknowledged from the standpoint of conventional truth by the philosophers of the Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika school can be regarded to be based on the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, and the *Gaṇavāyūha*,<sup>(67)</sup> etc., all of which belong to a period prior to the division into the two branches of Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādins. The reason is as follows:

a) Kamalaśīla says in his SDNS:

<sup>(68)</sup>...

The Blessed One proclaimed in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, etc., as follows.

I declare that all existence are devoid of intrinsic nature for the purpose of explaining three kinds of non-substantiality with regard to three kinds of nature.

This teaching is not inconsistent with [our Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika philosophy], since it is is not inconsistent [for Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika proponents] to establish three kinds of

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(64) cf. II The Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika view of Mind-only (*citta-mātra*) of part II, I The Characteristic of the Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika philosophy and II The *Vijñāna* Theory of Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra of Part III.

(65) MHVT D221b<sup>5</sup>

'di ltar kho bo cag ni kun rdzob tu chos rnams rgyu dan rkyen rigs mthun pa las 'byun ba sgyu ma bžin du yod pa ŋid du 'dod de ŋo bo ŋid med pa'i phyir Yamaguchi Susumu. 山口益. Bukkō ni okeru Mu to U to ro. Tairon 仏教に於ける無と有との対論. p.538

(66) cf. II. The *Vijñāna* Theory of Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra. Note (25) (26) (30).

(67) cf. Note (4) and p.29 of Part I.

(68) Note (116) and (117) of SDNS. IV

nature (<sup>...68)</sup> *tri-svabhāva*).

b) In the same way, he states in his SDNS:

<sup>(69)...</sup> The Blessed One declared in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, etc., that such things as cognition (*viññāna*) is a reality in order to have disciples (*vineya*) who adhere to arising (*utpāda*), ceasing (*nirodha*) and so forth discard nihilistic ideas. The intention of this teaching must be understood not from the viewpoint of highest truth. <sup>...69)</sup>

c) Kamalaśīla also says in his MAP:

<sup>(70)...</sup> [We] do not have inconsistency [in our position] because we advocate the teaching in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* [viz., the theory of mind-only] which is referred to by the Yogācāra-vādins as correct from the standpoint of conventional truth. <sup>...70)</sup>

In addition, LAS is often cited by Kamalaśīla as well as Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita when they demonstrate that cognition (*viññāna*) is real from the standpoint of conventional truth.

3) Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra point out, in terms of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), the incompatibility of unity (*eka*) and multiplicity (*aneka*) that exist between cognition (*viññāna*) and images (*ākāra*) when they refute the view of the Satyākāra-vādins. In refuting the view of the Alikākāra-vādins, they point out the incompatibility that exists between the real nondual cognition (*advaya-jñāna*) and unreal (alika) images.

Moreover, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra show that nondual cognition cannot be proven by inference (*anumāna*) and that there is neither a relation of identity (*tādātmya*) nor one of causality (*tadutpatti*) between nondual cognition and unreal images (*alīkākāra*).

4) Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Haribhadra hold the same position and represent one lineage of the Yogācāra-mādhyaṃika school in that they refute the theory of atoms and the Satyākāra and Alikākāravādin position of mind-only, instead acknowledging from the standpoint of conventional truth the theory of mind-only (*citta-mātra*).

69) Note (9), (30)

70) MAP P137a<sup>1-2</sup> D128a<sup>4-5</sup>

*des na rnam par ṣes pa smra ba rnams kyis dgoñs pa ñes par 'grel pa'i mdo las bstan pas phyr 'jil bar byed pa gañ yin pa de yañ dag pa'i kun rdzob tu bstan pa'i phyr mi 'gal ba ñid du ṣes ston par byed do //*

January 1984

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